In the problem of perfectly reliable message transmission (PRMT), a sender S and a receiver R are connected by n bidirectional synchronous channels. A mixed adversary A (t b ,t f ,t p ) with infinite computing power controls t b , t f and t p channels in Byzantine, failstop and passive fashion respectively. Inspite of the presence of A (t b ,t f ,t p ) , S wants to reliably send a message m to R, using some protocol, without sharing any key with R beforehand. After interacting in phases 1 as per the protocol, R should output m = m, without any error. In the problem of perfectly secure message transmission (PSMT), there is an additional constraint that A (t b ,t f ,t p ) should not know any information about m in information theoretic sense. The adversary can be either static 2 or mobile.
Introduction
In perfectly reliable message transmission (PRMT) problem, a sender S is connected to a receiver R in an unreliable network by n vertex disjoint paths called wires; S wishes to send a message m chosen from a finite field F reliably to R, in a guaranteed manner (without any error), in spite of the presence of several kinds of faults in the network. The perfectly secure message transmission (PSMT) problem has an additional constraint that the adversary should get no information about m. The faults in the network is modeled by an adversary who controls the actions of nodes in the network in a variety of ways and have unbounded computing power. Security against such an adversary is called information theoretic security, which is also known as perfect security. Since the adversary has unbounded computing power, we cannot use any cryptographic primitive, such as public key cryptography, hash function, etc to solve PSMT problem. The PRMT and PSMT problem was first studied and solved by Dolev et.al [6] against static Byzantine adversary. The PRMT and PSMT problems are very important primitives in various reliable and secure distributed protocols. If S and R are connected directly via a private and authenticated link (which is generally assumed in generic secure multiparty protocols [2, 8, 16, 24] ), reliable and secure communication is trivially guaranteed. However, in reality, it is not economical to directly connect every two players in the network. Therefore such a complete network can only be virtually realized by simulating the missing links using PRMT and PSMT protocols as primitives.
Existing Results: There are various settings in which PRMT and PSMT problem has been studied extensively in the past (see [6, 5, 7, 17, 9, 22] ). The most natural and interesting question posed in the context of PRMT/PSMT are: (a) POSSIBILITY: What is the necessary and sufficient condition that a given network should satisfy for the possibility of PRMT/PSMT from S to R? (b) OPTIMALITY: Once the POSSIBILITY of a protocol is ensured in a given network, what is the communication complexity lower bound for any reliable/secure protocol to send a message of specific length. Moreover, how to design communication optimal PRMT/PSMT protocols which satisfies the lower bound? The above questions can be examined in various settings. The questions in (a) and (b) have been completely answered against static Byzantine adversarial model in [15, 19, 1, 21, 10] ) and against mobile Byzantine adversarial model in [22, 14] . In [18] , the authors have partially answered the questions (a) and (b) against static mixed adversarial model. However, nothing is known in mobile mixed adversarial model. Also in spite of being a very practical adversarial model, mobile mixed adversary have got no exposure.
Why to Study Mixed Mobile Adversary: In a typical large network, certain nodes may be strongly protected and few others may be moderately/weakly protected. An adversary may only be able to failstop(/eavesdrop in) a strongly protected node, while he may affect a weakly protected node in Byzantine fashion. Thus, we may capture the abilities of an adversary in a more realistic manner using three parameters t b , t f , t p where t b , t f , t p are the number of nodes under the influence of adversary in Byzantine, failstop and passive fashion respectively. Also it is better to grade different kinds of disruption done by adversary and consider them separately rather than treating every kind of fault as Byzantine fault as this is an "overkill". Also we stress that many times mobile adversary captures practical scenarios better than static adversary. For example when S and R are engaged in interaction for a long time, then some faults in initial phases can be fixed and in the mean time, a hacker may attack some other nodes.
Recently in [20] , the authors have studied the issues related to the possibility and optimality of unconditional reliable message transmission 4 (which is same as PRMT with exponentially small probability of error in reliability) and unconditional secure message transmission 5 (which is same as PSMT with exponentially small probability of error in reliability only), in undirected synchronous networks, tolerating static mixed adversary. However, the techniques used in [20] cannot be used to design PRMT/PSMT protocols against static and mobile mixed adversary.
Our Contribution: In this work, we focus our attention on PRMT/PSMT in undirected synchronous networks against static and mobile mixed adversary. Table 1 tabulates both the existing and proposed (in this paper) connectivity requirement and communication complexity lower bound results. [15] , we find that using an additional phase, we get a communication optimal PSMT protocol against static mixed adversary.
Contribution 1 We provide a worst case four phase communication optimal PSMT protocol tolerating static mixed adversary which is a first protocol of its kind. Comparing this with the existing three phase communication optimal PSMT protocol against static Byzantine adversary

Contribution 2 We give the characterization for the possibility of any PRMT protocol against mobile mixed adversary and show that it is same as against static mixed adversary. We prove lower bound on the communication complexity of any PRMT protocol against mobile mixed adversary and show it is tight by designing a three phase communication optimal
PRMT protocol, whose communication complexity matches this bound. Comparing these results with existing results for PRMT against static mixed adversary, we find that though mobility of mixed adversary has no affect on possibility of PRMT protocols, it significantly affects its optimality. This is surprising because mobile Byzantine and static Byzantine adversary has same effect in PRMT in terms of possibility [22] and optimality [14] . To design our protocols, we propose new techniques, which can be effectively used against both static and mobile mixed adversary. These techniques are completely different from the techniques used in [20] to design PPRMT/PPSMT protocols against static mixed adversary. We stress that our results on mixed adversary are not simple and trivial extensions of the existing results for Byzantine adversary.
Definitions, Network Settings and Adversarial Model
The underlying network is a connected synchronous network represented by an undirected graph where S and R are two nodes. A mixed adversary, with unbounded computing power, controls at most t b , t f and t p nodes (excluding S, R) in Byzantine, fail-stop and passive fashion respectively. Following approach of [6] , we abstract the network and concentrate on solving PRMT/PSMT problem for a single pair of processors (S, R), connected by n vertex disjoint paths w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n , also known as wires. 6 In the worst case, if adversary controls a single node on a wire, then out of n wires, at most t b , t f and t p wires can be under the control of the adversary in Byzantine, failstop and passive fashion respectively.
A wire which is controlled in a failstop fashion may fail to deliver any information, but if it delivers the information then it will be correct. However, the adversary will have no idea about the information that passed through a wire which is controlled in failstop fashion. A wire which is passively controlled will always deliver correct information. However, the adversary will also completely know the information, which passed through a passively controlled wire. A Byzantine corrupted wire may deliver correct information or it may deliver incorrect information. However, in any case, the adversary will completely know the information, which passed through a Byzantine corrupted wire. controls different set of wires in different phases of the protocol, it does not allow the adversary to gain any information which has previously passed (in earlier phases of the protocol) through the wires under its control in current phase. This is because the wires (and hence the nodes along these wires) erases all the local information from its memory at the end of each phase. Also any wire which is not under the control of the adversary in current phase will behave correctly, irrespective of the way it behaved in earlier phases of a protocol. The adversary can gain information from the wires in a cumulative fashion. For example, suppose during first phase of a protocol, A mobile (1,1,1) controls w 1 , w 2 and w 3 in Byzantine, failstop and passive fashion respectively in a network, where S and R are connected by wires w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w 5 . Now suppose during second phase, it controls w 2 , w 4 and w 5 in Byzantine, failstop and passive fashion respectively. Then w 1 and w 3 will behave correctly during second phase and adversary has no access to the information passing through them in second phase. At the end of second phase, adversary will know the information which passed through w 1 and w 3 during first phase and the information which passed through w 2 and w 5 during second phase. [4] , who dynamically corrupt nodes (wires) during the protocol execution and whose choice of corrupting a wire may depend on the data seen so far. This is so because a node (wire) which is once under the control of adaptive adversary, will remain so throughout the protocol whereas in case of mobile adversary, it may become free in subsequent phases of the protocol. Also, adaptive adversary is slightly different from static adversary in the sense that static adversary decides which wires to control before the start of the protocol. Our protocols designed against static mixed adversary will also work against adaptive adversary without any modification.
Remark 1 A mobile adversary is different from an adaptive adversary
Throughout the paper we use m to denote the message that S wants to send to R. m is a sequence of field elements from a finite field F. The only restriction on F is that |F| ≥ n. We use |m| to denote the number of field elements in m. Any information which is sent through all the wires is said to be "broadcast". If x is "broadcast" over at least 2t b + t f + 1 wires, then at most t f wires may fail to deliver x, where as at most t b wires may deliver incorrect x. But at least t b + 1 wires will deliver correct x. So receiver will be able to correctly receive x by taking majority vote. The communication complexity of any protocol is the total number of field elements communicated by S and R in the protocol. We say that a wire is corrupted, if the information sent over the wire is changed. A wire which is not under the control of the adversary is said to be honest. 
Coding Theory Preliminaries
In our protocols, we have used Reed-Solomon (RS) codes, which are used to reliably send message over a noisy channel. Let Ch (t b ,t f ) denote a noisy channel, where at most t f and t b locations of a codeword can be arbitrarily erased and changed respectively during the transmission. We call the later type of errors as Byzantine error. [11, 13] : Berlekamp Welch algorithm is one of the most simple and efficient RS decoding algorithm existing in the literature. In general, we denote the RS decoding algorithm by RS − DEC (n , c, d, k) . The algorithm takes an n length codeword C received through Ch (t b ,t f ) , where C corresponds to a codeword which was encoded using a polynomial of degree k − 1 (so the message block size is k). The algorithm tries to correct at most c Byzantine errors in C . In addition to this, it tries to detect at most d additional Byzantine errors (if they are present) in C . The algorithm either (a) outputs a polynomial of degree k − 1, along with an error list or (b) fails to output any polynomial of degree k − 1. The error list (if it is produced) contains at most c entries, where each entry is a pair, indicating an error location in C along with the value received at that location in C . We illustrate (a) and (b) in the sequel, in the context of our PRMT and PSMT protocols.
RS-DECODING ALGORITHM
Definition 3 We call an error list generated by RS −DEC algorithm as "good" if each of the values in the error list, pointed as corrupted/modified value, is indeed corrupted. Otherwise we call the error list as "bad".
When an error list is "bad", it must point a correct value in C as corrupted.
We now design a single phase PRMT protocol called PRU-SP-Mixed using RS codes. In the protocol, S and R are connected by N ≥ 2t b + t f + 1 wires, w i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , of which at most t b and t f wires can be under the control of a static adversary in Byzantine and fail-stop fashion respectively (N ≥ 2t b + t f + 1 wires are necessary and sufficient for the existence of any PRMT protocol tolerating such a static adversary [18] ). The goal is to reliably send a message m containing field elements from S to R.
• S breaks up m into blocks B1, B2, . . . , B /k , each consisting of k field elements, where
If is not an exact multiple of k, a default padding is used to make mod k = 0.
• For each block
Note that the RS codeword of all the blocks of m are computed and sent parallely by S to R in a single phase.
• R parallely receives the (possibly corrupted/erased) cji's for all B j 's and applies the RS decoding algorithm to each of them and reconstructs all B j 's. R then concatenates the B j 's to recover the message m.
Lemma 1 Protocol PRU-SP-Mixed correctly sends m by communicating
Proof: Follows from the working of the protocol and Theorem 1.
2 Protocol PRU-SP-Mixed has another important property given in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 If R in advance knows the identity of α ≤ t b wires which are under the control of Byzantine adversary, then protocol PRU-SP-Mixed can reliably send m using block size
Proof: Since R knows α wires which are under the control of Byzantine adversary, it simply ignores these wires and therefore the connectivity (set of active wires) reduces to N − α. Also among the values received by R along these N − α wires, at most t b − α could be Byzantine corrupted. Substituting these values in Theorem 1, we get . Essentially, S sends one random t b degree polynomial over each of the n wires and their n values distributed over n wires. After a sequence of interaction between S and R according to the protocol, the constant coefficients of the t b + 1 polynomials which are not under the control of the adversary, are established as an information theoretic secure "one time pad" between S and R. Moreover the communication complexity of the interaction is O(n 2 ). Now using this one time pad, S securely sends t b + 1 = Θ(n) field elements to R by communicating O(n 2 ) field elements [15] .
For tolerating A static (t b ,t f ,tp) , S and R must be connected by at least n = 2t b + t f + t p + 1 wires (see Theorem 4) . Now if we use the same technique of sending polynomials as well as their values (as used in OPSMT protocol againt A static t b ), S and R end up in establishing a secure "one time pad" of length t b + 1 after communicating O(n 2 ) field elements. The reason is that adversary can crash t f wires and passively listen the polynomials over (t b + t p ) wires. Therefore only n − t f − t b − t p = t b + 1 polynomials will be unknown to the adversary. Since n = 2t b +t f +t p +1, t b may not be Θ(n) and can even be a constant. Thus the resulting PSMT protocol may send a message of very small size with very high communication complexity of O(n 2 ), which will not be an OPSMT protocol against A static
In the next section, we propose certain new protocols based on some new techniques, using which we can design OPSMT protocols tolerating both A static
OPSMT Tolerating Static Mixed Adversary
Here we first recall the characterization for the possibility and the lower bound on communication complexity of any multiphase PSMT protocol tolerating A static (t b ,t f ,tp) [18] .
Theorem 4 ([18]) Any r-phase (r ≥ 2) PSMT protocol between S and R in an undirected
Proof: If part: We now show that if the network is not (2t b + t f + t p + 1)-(S,R)-connected, then no PSMT protocol exists. For this, we make use of the result by Dolev et al. [6] , which states that PSMT against a static adversary who can corrupt up to any t b and t p nodes in the network in Byzantine and passive fashion respectively, is possible if and only if the network N is (2t b + t p + 1)-(S,R)-connected. 7 Assume that a PSMT protocol Π exists in a network N which is not (2t
Consider the network N that is induced by N on deleting t f vertices from a minimal vertex cutset of N (this can be interpreted as an adversary blocking the communication over t f vertex disjoint paths). It follows that N is not a (2t b + t p + 1)-(S,R)-connected network. Evidently, if Π is a PSMT protocol on N , then Π is a PSMT protocol on N , where Π is the protocol Π restricted to the players in N . But from [6] , we know that Π exists only if the network N is (2t b + t p + 1)-(S,R)-connected. Thus no such Π is possible and hence no protocol Π over N tolerating the original adversary is possible.
Only If Part: Let the underlying network be (2t 
Proof: The proof follows by extending the entropy based argument used in [21] to prove the lower bound on the communication complexity of any r-phase (r ≥ 2) PSMT protocol against A static t b
.
2
Let S and R be connected by n = 2t presented in [15] shows that additional one phase is enough to design OPSMT protocol against A static (t b ,t f ,t p ) . We first design few sub-protocols and finally combine them to get OP SM T Π static (t b ,t f ,tp) . Assumption 1 In our protocols, we assume that whenever sender sends some information to receiver through n wires, then the receiver receives information over first n − t f ≤ N ≤ n wires and the last n − N fails to deliver any information to the receiver. This is without loss of generality because receiver can always broadcast back the index of the wires over which it has not received any information. This does not affect the communication complexity of our protocols. 
P ad Establishment
Computation by B • B receives L f ault and neglects any information received over w i ∈ L f ault . Among the remaining wires, at most t f wires can fail to deliver any information. Suppose B receives values over the first n ≥ n−|L f ault |−t f wires. Let B receives q ji over
] is established correctly and securely between A and B.
Theorem 6 P ad Establishment
2 Byzantine corrupted wires and neglects them. Among the remaining wires, at most t f can fail to deliver any information. So in the worst case n = 2t b + t p + 1 − |L f ault |. The codeword Q j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n received by B, represents a RS codeword, which is RS encoded using a polynomial of degree The adversary gets at most wires get corrupted during first phase, then the pad will not be established. However, either A comes to know the identity of at least Proof: We prove the theorem for the worst case where during Phase I, t f wires failed to deliver any information to B. Hence B receives information over n = n − t f = 2t b + t p + 1 wires during first phase. Hence each of the received codewords P j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n will contain n = 2t b + t p + 1 values, of which at most t b could be corrupted. Also, each P j is originally RS encoded using a polynomial p j (x) of degree k − 1 = t b + t p . During Phase II, B tries to correct at most c = 2 values in each P j could be corrupted. Hence RS − DEC will successfully correct all errors in each P j . Hence B will recover each p j (x) correctly and all the error lists will be "good". When A gets the error lists from B, it finds that they are "good" and concludes that B has recovered each
Phase I: (A to B)
• In each P j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, B assumes at most , 0, t b +t p +1) algorithm to each P j and tries to reconstruct some polynomialp j (x) of degree t b + t p .
• If there exists some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, such that B fails to recover a t b + t p degree polynomial after applying RS − DEC(n ,
, 0, t b + tp + 1) to codeword P j , then B broadcasts to A, "ERROR-R" signal and received codeword P j , along with its index j. /* At least t b /2 + 1 Byzantine errors are present in P j . */
• If some polynomial of degree t b + t p is reconstructed after applying RS decoding algorithm to each of n received codewords, then B proceeds as follows:
Let Error List j denotes the error list obtained by applying RS decoding algorithm to P j . Also let L j be the number of pairs in Error Listj. Since RS decoding is applied to P j , assuming the number of errors in P j to be at most
Computation by A
• If A receives "ERROR-R" signal and index j along with P j , then A locally compares P j with P j (the original j th codeword restricted to first n locations), finds the identity of at least
+ 1 faulty wires which delivered incorrect components of Pj during first phase and TERMINATES the protocol.
• If A receives n error-lists and all the n error lists are "good", then A concludes that B has recovered each p j (x), 1 ≤ j ≤ n correctly and the protocol terminates. Otherwise, A finds at least one j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, such that Error Listj is "bad". If there are multiple such j's, A randomly selects one. In this case, A concludes that B reconstructedp j (x) = p j (x) and initiates Phase III.
Conditional Phase III: A to B
• If A has identified a j such that B has reconstructedp j (x) = p j (x), then A broadcasts to B the tuple [pj1 pj2 . . . pjn], which is the original codeword corresponding to pj(x) (which A had sent during Phase I). In this case, B correctly receives the actual codeword corresponding to p j (x), compares it with the codeword P j (corresponding to p j (x)) which it has received during Phase I, identifies more than 
Reducing the Communication Complexity of Protocol Error Identif ication
We now present a nice trick to reduce the communication complexity of sending n errorlists from O(n 2 t b ) to O(n 2 ) in Phase II of protocol Error Identif ication Π static (t b ,t f ,tp) (previously, it has been broadcast). Let ERROR List J be the the error-list with maximum number of pairs L J , where J ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. If there are several error-lists with L J pairs, then B arbitrarily selects one. B then broadcasts only Error List J and sends the remaining error-lists after concatenating them into a list Y and executing the protocol PRU-SP-Mixed(Y, |Y |, n, t b , t f , L J ). A correctly receives Error List J and verifies whether it is "good" . If it is, then A concludes that B has correctly recovered p J (x). In this case, A also identifies L J faulty wires from Error List J . Thus from Theorem 3, protocol PRU-SPMixed will correctly deliver the list Y containing the remaining error-lists. On the other hand, if A finds that Error List J is "bad", then A concludes that B has not recovered p J (x) correctly. In this case, A fails to know L J faults from Error List J and hence can not recover list Y delivered using PRU-SP-Mixed. But still A identifies one polynomial (p J (x)) which is not received correctly by B (due to more than 
If during Phase II, some polynomial of degree t b + tp is obtained after applying RS decoding algorithm to each of the n received codewords, then B proceeds as follows: ,t f ,tp) . In the protocol, we show, how a one time pad is established between S and R. Once S knows that the pad is going to be established, S can blind the message by XORing it with the pad and broadcasts the blinded message to R in the last phase of the protocol. On receiving the blinded message, R extracts the message by XORing the blinded message with the pad.
• R and S starts executing protocol Error Identif ication Π (0)] is established securely between R and S, then R terminates the protocol by broadcasting "SUCCESS-R" signal to S.
• IF at the end of Phase II of protocol Error Identif ication Π • IF at the end of Phase III of protocol Error Identif ication Π We now prove the correctness and security of protocol OP SM T Π static (t b ,t f ,t p ) . 2 + 1 faulty wires (Theorem 7). Now S establishes the pad q with R during fourth phase, using P ad Establishment (see Theorem 6) . The security of pad p (q) follows from Theorem 7 (Theorem 6).
Proof: The communication complexity follows from Lemma 2, Theorem 6 and working of the protocol. From Theorem 5, in an n = 2t b + t f + t p + 1 connected network, any four phase PSMT protocol has to communicate Ω(n 2 ) field elements to securely send n field elements against A static
Remark 2 Noticeably OP SM T Π static (t b ,t f ,t p ) sends only codeword of polynomials, in contrast to the existing protocol summarized in section 4, which sends both polynomial and its codeword. The advantage that we get by sending only codeword is that we obtain one information theoretic secure value per codeword (after some intermediate information exchanges and then applying RS decoding), thus establishing a secure one time pad of size Θ(n) between S and R.
Soon, we will show that this technique can be used to design OPRMT and OPSMT protocols even against mobile mixed adversary.
OPRMT Tolerating Mobile Mixed Adversary
We first recall that for the existence of any PRMT protocol tolerating A static (t b ,t f ,tp) , the network should be (2t b + t f + 1)-(S, R)-connected [18] . For full details see APPENDIX B. In the presence of A mobile (t b ,t f ,tp) , the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of any PRMT protocol between S and R is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 11 Any PRMT protocol between S and R in an undirected network N = (P, E), tolerating a mobile mixed adversary
Proof: If part: (2t b + t f + 1)-(S,R)-connected network is required for the existence of PRMT protocols against a weaker adversary A static (t b ,t f ,t p ) [18] . Hence it is required against more stronger A mobile (t b ,t f ,tp) also.
Only If Part: Suppose that the network is (2t b + t f + 1)-(S, R)-connected. S broadcasts the message over all the wires. R then recovers the message by taking the majority voting. 2 As a sufficiency proof, we specified broadcasting which is a naive protocol. It communicates n field elements for transmitting elements reliably. [18] , it is shown that any PRMT protocol in a n-(S, R)-connected network
field elements in order to reliably send 
Theorem 12 Any PRMT protocol between S and R connected by
n ≥ 2t b + t f + 1 wires under the influence of A mobile (t b ,t f ,t p ) must communicate Ω( n n−(t b +t f ) ) field
elements in order to transmit a message containing field elements.
Proof: We now prove the lower bound on the communication complexity of any r-phase (r ≥ 2) PRMT protocol which sends field elements tolerating A mobile (t b ,t f ,t p ) . The proof of the theorem is inspired by entropy based argument, used to prove the lower bound on the communication complexity of PRMT/PSMT protocols against A static t b [21] . Before providing the proof, we first try to quantify the reason behind different lower bound for static and mobile mixed adversary. In static case, the lower bound is derived by assuming that both S and R knows the set of wires which are fail-stop corrupted in advance. Hence the term (n−t f ) appears in the numerator of the lower bound expression against A static (t b ,t f ,t p ) (see Remark 3). This is a reasonable assumption because against static adversary, we can always strategies protocols to remember faults caught in earlier phases and use that knowledge to amortize the overall communication complexity and message size in later phases (the OPRMT protocol of [23] is based on this important principle). However, protocols tolerating mobile mixed adversary is memoryless because adversary corrupts different set of wires in different phases of the protocol. Hence, the protocols against mobile mixed adversary cannot use the knowledge of the faults, specially fail-stop faults, which occurred in previous phases, to amortize the communication complexity and message size in later phases. We now present our formal proof for this theorem. To prove the lemma, we begin with defining a weaker version of single-phase PRMT called PRMT with Error Detection (PRMTED). We then prove the equivalence of communication complexity of PRMTED protocol to send message M and the share complexity (sum of the length of all shares) of distributing n shares for M such that any set of n − b − F correct shares has full information about M. To prove the aforementioned statement, we show their equivalence (Claim 4). We then show the equivalence of single-phase protocol PRMTED and multiphase PRMT protocol in terms of communication complexity and also answer the question: why it is weaker than multiphase PRMT protocol (Claim 6). These two equivalence will prove the desired equivalence as stated in this lemma. Observe that PRMTED is a strictly weaker version of PRMT because a PRMT protocol not only detects errors but also corrects them. We next show that the properties of PRMTED protocol for sending message M is equivalent to the problem of distributing n shares for M such that any set of n − b − F correct shares has full information about M. By definition the adversary can block all the messages sent along the F wires not in C and change the messages along b wires not in C, such that the set of set of all messages received by R is identical to M essage(M , C). In this case, R receives the message M , while S sent M . This is a contradiction since R must detect that there has been a corruption. 2
The above claim also says that the communication complexity of PRMTED protocol to send M is same as the share complexity (sum of the length of all shares) of distributing n shares for a message M such that any set of n − b − F shares has full information about M. Now we step forward to show the communication complexity of PRMTED protocol is the lower bound on the communication complexity of any multiphase PRMT protocol against
Before that we take a closer look at the execution of any multi-phase PRMT protocol against A mobile (t b ,t f ,tp) . S and R are modeled as polynomial time Turing machines with access to a random tape. The number of random bits used by the S and R are bounded by a polynomial q(n). Let r 1 , r 2 ∈ {0, 1} q(n) denote the contents of the random tapes of S and R respectively. The message M is an element from the set {0, 1} p(n) , where p(n) is a polynomial. A transcript for an execution of a multiphase PRMT protocol Π is the concatenation of all the messages sent by S and R along all the wires. Given (M, r 1 , r 2 ) it is possible for S to compute T (Π, M, r 1 , r 2 ) by simulating R with random tape r 2 . Similarly given (M, r 1 , r 2 ), R can compute T (Π, M, r 1 , r 2 ) by simulating S with r 1 . Note that although S and R require both r 1 , r 2 to generate the transcript T , R requires only r 2 in order to obtain the message M from the transcript T . This is clear since R does not have access to r 1 during the execution of Π but still can retrieve the message M from the messages exchanged. • S wants to send M. S and R executes Π. The adversary blocks messages over Y and changes the messages along wires in X such that the view of S is T B−Y (Π, M, r 1 , r 2 ) but the view of R is T B−Y (Π, M , r 1 , r 2 ). Since T B−Y (Π, M , r 1 , r 2 ) is a valid transcript with respect to M , R will terminate with output M .
The two scenarios differ only in the adversarial behavior and in the contents of R's random tape. In both the scenarios S wanted to send message M. But the message received by receiver R in the second case is an incorrect message M . This is a contradiction because Π is a PRMT protocol.
2 Till now, we have shown that a passive transcript over at least n − b − F wires allows R to output M correctly. We now show how to reduce a multiphase PRMT protocol into a single phase PRMTED protocol.
Protocol PRMTED
• S computes the passive transcript T (Π, M, r 1 , r 2 ) for some random r 1 and r 2 and sends T (Π, M, r 1 , r 2 , w i ) to R along wire wi.
• If R does not receives information through at least n − F wires then R outputs ERROR and stop. Otherwise, let R receives information over the set of wires B = {wi 1 , wi 2 , . . . , wi α } where n − F ≤ |B| ≤ n. R concatenates the values received along these wires to obtain a transcript T B (which may be corrupted along b wires) and does the following:
If TB is a valid transcript with random tape contents r2 for message M then output M and stop. Output ERROR.
Claim 3 The Communication complexity of any multiphase PRMT protocol
is at least the communication complexity of PRMTED protocol.
Proof: The communication complexity of any multiphase PRMT protocol Π assuming the adversary to be passive during the complete execution, is trivially a lower bound for any multiphase PRMT protocol with corruption in any phase. In PRMTED, S communicates the transcript generated by him assuming adversary to be passive throughout the execution of Π to R. It is easy to see that the cost of communicating such a transcript by PRMTED is same as of Π with the assumption that adversary remain passive throughout the execution of Π.
From Claim 5, we know that valid transcripts of two different messages cannot be adversely close to each other. So irrespective of the actions of the adversary, the transcript received by R cannot be a valid transcript for any message other than M for any value of r 2 . Hence if R outputs a message M then it is the same message sent by S.
2 This completes the proof of Lemma 5. We now prove the share complexity of distributing n shares for a message such that any set of n − b − F correct shares has full information about the message.
Lemma 4
The share-complexity (that is sum of the length of all shares) of distributing n shares for a message of size field elements from F such that any set of n − b − F correct shares has full information about the message is Ω(
Proof: Let X i denotes the i th share. For any subset A ⊆ {1, 2 . . . n}, let X A denotes the set of variables {X i |i ∈ A}. Let M be a value drawn uniformly at random from F l . Then the message M and the shares X i are random variables. Let H(X) for a random variable denote its entropy. Let H(X|Y ) denotes the entropy of X conditional on Y . The conditional entropy measures how much entropy a random variable X has remaining if we have already learned completely the value of a second random variable Y [3] . Since any set B consisting of n − b − F shares has full information about M, we have H(M|X B ) = 0. Since M is chosen uniformly from F , we have
From the chain rule of the entropy [3] , for any two random variable X 1 , X 2 , we have
From the properties of joint entropy [3] , for any two variables X 1 , X 2 , we have
. Substituting in the above equation, we get
≤ H(X B ) + 0 because M can be known completely fromX B
Consequently, H(M) ≤ H(X B
. Therefore for any set B of cardinality n − b − F , we have
Since there are , which reliably sends a message m containing nt b (t b ≥ 1) field elements by communicating O(n 2 ) field elements, where n = 2t b + t f + 1. If t b = Θ(n), then the protocol sends Θ(n 2 ) field elements by communicating O(n 2 ) field elements. Note that if t b = 0, then we can directly send a message of size by broadcasting it over n wires, incurring a communication cost of O(n ), which will be an OPRMT protocol (for t b = 0). theorem. can corrupt different set of wires in each phase, the protocol cannot adapt as it finds corrupted wires; thus it can be considered to be memoryless. In general, a mobile adversary is more powerful than static adversary. So the lower bound given in Theorem 5 is trivially a lower bound against mobile adversary. We now show that this bound is tight. We present a constant phase OPSMT protocol OP SM T Π mobile (t b ,t f ,t p ) which securely sends Θ(n) field elements by communicating O(n 2 ) field elements against A mobile (t b ,t f ,tp) , where S and R are connected by n = 2t b + t f + t p + 1 wires. The protocol terminates in at most nine phases and establishes an information theoretically secure one time pad of length either n − 1 or n 2 between S and R. Phase I: S to R S selects n random polynomials p j (x), 1 ≤ j ≤ n over F, each of degree t b + t p , such that pj(0) = sj. For each pj(x), S forms a RS codeword [cj1 cj2 . . . cjn] of size n and sends cji over wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Phase II: R to S R receives c ji 's over the first n − t f ≤ n ≤ n wires. R applies RS − DEC(n , pairs. R then combines only the first n 2 error lists and reliably sends them to S using three phase PRMT protocol OP RM T Π mobile (t b ,t f ,tp) . 2. There exists at least one J ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, such that RS − DEC, when applied to C J , fails to output any t b + t p degree polynomial. In this case, R broadcasts C J and its index J.
Notice that the technique proposed in section 5.3 for sending n error lists in a single phase incurring O(n 2 ) communication complexity, can not be adopted against mobile adversary. This is so because the technique used the knowledge of the Byzantine corruption done in earlier phases. However, mobile adversary can corrupt different set of wires in different phases. So, here we use the three phase reliable protocol OP RM T Π mobile (t b ,t f ,t p ) to send the error lists in three phases with same communication complexity of O(n 2 ). Also note that ,t f ,tp) and locally checks the status of these error lists.
• If all error lists are "good", then S concludes that R has correctly recovered p j (x), 1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 correctly and an information theoretically secure pad [p 1 (0) p 2 (0) p n/2 (0)] is established with R. S terminates the protocol by broadcasting terminating signal to R. Accordingly R terminates the protocol.
• If ∃J ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n 2 }, such that Error ListJ is "bad", then S concludes that more than values has been changed in J th codeword during Phase I.
Phase V: S to R (If second case happens in the above computation) S asks R to broadcast the J th codeword as received by R during Phase I. S does this by broadcasting index J along with "ERROR" signal.
Phase VI: R to S On receiving "ERROR" signal and index J during Phase V, R broadcasts C J , received during Phase I.
Phase VII: S to R On receiving C J , S identifies more than
